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•  It is estimated that over 1/3 of  the world’s poor 
are Muslim 
•  Many do not take advantage of  existing 
interest-based microfinance products 
•  Shari’a law 
•  Religious law and moral code of  Islam  
•  Interest rates are prohibited 
	  
Motivation	  
•  Islamic microfinance suggested as remedy  
•  In 2011, outreach gap estimated at 53 million 
(Malkawi et al., 2011) 
•  Profit and loss sharing contracts 
•  MFI bears a portion of  the risk 
•  Does not charge interest rates 
•  Few studies examine the intersection of  
conventional and Islamic microfinance 
Research	  Questions	  









Islamic Microfinance Risk 
Barriers to take-up Experiments Risk Aversion 
Religious Restrictions 
•  Dutta and Magableh (2006) 
•  Karim et al. (2008) 
•  Dusuki (2006) 
Higher take-up and 
compliance rates 
•  El-Komi and Croson 
(2011) 
•  El-Gamal et al.  (2012) 
Microfinance 
•  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
•  de Meza (1990)  
Implementing IMFI Model 
•  Ahmed (2002) 
•  Obaidullah (2008) 
Entrepreneurs 
•  Vereshchagina et al. 
(2009) 
•  Moskowitz et al. (2002) 
•  Cressy (2000) 
•  Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979) 
Sample	  
•  Two MFIs 
•  National Microfinance 
Bank 
•  Development and 
Employment Fund 
•  10 branches across 
Jordan 
•  221 observations 
•  143 Conventional 
•  78 Islamic  
Summary Statistics 
Individual/Household Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max T-statistic*
Age 37.7 9.9 20 60 37.8 9.7 20 60 37.4 10.2 21 59 0.26
Gender (female=1) 0.8 0.4 0 1 0.9 0.3 0 1 0.4 0.5 0 1 -9.46***
Education 2.9 1.4 0 7 2.8 1.3 0 7 3.1 1.5 0 6 0.33
Business 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.07
Employment 0.6 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 -1.10
Household Income 414.6 288.4 0 2550 421.6 307.4 0 2550 401.8 251.1 100 1500 0.50
Loan size 941.4 847.1 200 3500 661.0 473.0 200 3500 1455.5 1106.3 500 3500 7.4***
Phone 0.8 0.4 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 1 0 1 1 -6.84***
Ramadan 0.7 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 0.9 0.2 0 1 -6.50***
Type of Borrower 0.65 0.35
Religion Index 0.01 0.3 -0.8 0.98 -0.03 0.3 -0.7 0.9 0.08 0.3 -0.8 0.98 -2.31**
Religious Practice 0.7 0.3 0 1 0.7 0.3 0 1 0.6 0.3 0 1 1.01
Literary Knowledge 0.3 0.2 0 1 0.2 0.3 0 1 0.3 0.2 0 1 -2.8***
Religious Attitude 0.8 0.3 0 1 0.8 0.2 0 1 0.8 0.3 0 1 .27
Financial Attitude 0.4 0.3 0 1 0.4 0.5 0 1 0.4 0.5 0.0 1 -0.75
Risk Index 0.01 0.4 -0.8 1.3 -0.02 0.4 -0.8 1.3 0.1 0.4 -0.8 1.1 -1.28
Business Risk 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.95*
Personal Risk 0.4 0.3 0 1 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 -1.40
Entrepreneurial Risk 0.5 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.03































Average Risk for Conventional and Islamic Borrowers 
Average Religiosity for Conventional and Islamic Borrowers 
Empirical	  Model	  
•  Linear Probability Model

 Yi = β1 + β2Xi  + β2Zi + β3RPIi + β4RIi +εi 
 
 
•  Yi: binary variable for Islamic loan
•  Xi: Vector of  individual and household controls
•  Zi: Branch controls
•  RPIi: Risk Preference Index
•  RIi: Religion Index

Null	  Hypotheses	  
•  Ho: Religiosity does not vary between conventional and 
Islamic microfinance borrowers. 
 
•  Ho: Risk-tolerance does not vary between conventional and 





Linear Probability Model: Religion Summary Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Religion Index 0.260** 0.295** 0.194** 0.161* 0.144*
(0.118) (0.117) (0.088) (0.090) (0.084)
Gender (female=1) -0.408*** -0.415*** -0.386***
(0.083) (0.086) (0.081)
Log loan size 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.171***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.053)
Phone 0.296*** 0.305*** 0.108
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066)




Branch Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.330*** -0.011 -0.039 0.337 -0.097
(0.033) (0.020) (0.591) (0.628) (0.570)
Observations 196 196 196 186 196
R-squared 0.027 0.116 0.499 0.499 0.529
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Insignificant controls excluded 
from this table. Loan size in Jordanian Dinars.
Linear Probability Model: Risk Summary Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Risk Index 0.100 0.114 0.064 0.071 0.072
(0.078) (0.078) (0.063) (0.068) (0.065)
Gender (female=1) -0.404*** -0.413*** -0.396***
(0.076) (0.079) (0.075)
Log loan size 0.188*** 0.183*** 0.178***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.048)
Phone 0.326*** 0.328*** 0.143*
(0.065) (0.064) (0.075)




Branch Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.348*** -0.033 -0.238 -0.031 -0.152
(0.033) (0.031) (0.566) (0.597) (0.553)
Observations 212 212 212 202 212
R-squared 0.008 0.080 0.484 0.485 0.513
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Insignificant controls excluded 
from this table. Loan size in Jordanian Dinars.
Linear Probability Model: Risk and Religion Summary Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Risk Index 0.139* 0.150* 0.121* 0.113* 0.121*
(0.079) (0.079) (0.072) (0.068) (0.073)
Religion Index 0.299** 0.339*** 0.216** 0.193** 0.166*
(0.118) (0.119) (0.095) (0.089) (0.092)
Gender (female=1) -0.427*** -0.398*** -0.402***
(0.084) (0.081) (0.084)
Log loan size 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.162***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046)
Phone 0.284*** 0.088 0.102
(0.065) (0.069) (0.066)






Branch Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.324*** -0.046 0.276 -0.163 0.263
-0.033 -0.046 -0.631 -0.592 -0.628
Observations 189 189 180 189 180
R-squared 0.044 0.128 0.505 0.525 0.534
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Insignificant controls excluded 
from this table. Loan size in Jordanian Dinars.
Discussion	  




•  Females participate more in conventional 
microfinance
•  Islamic loans are larger
Limitations	  
•  Heterogeneous differences across borrowers
•  Sample size
•  Ramadan
•  Measurement of  a past event
